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In analyzing the design of monetary institutions, most of the literature has focussed on the
interaction between the monetary authorities and the private sector (see, e.g., Rogoff (1985) and
Lohmann (1992)). How fiscal and monetary institutions interact has received less attention
1,
although fiscal and monetary policies are related through several channels. In particular, monetary
policy impacts the public finances by generating seigniorage. Moreover, inflation surprises affect
the real burden to the budget of servicing nominal debt. Finally, both tax policy and unanticipated
inflation affect employment, a major objective of macroeconomic policy.
The modelling of both monetary and fiscal institutions allows one to distinguish between
the concepts of, on the one hand, central bank independence and, on the other hand, conservatism
of a central bank. Independence of the central bank involves the institutional setting of
policymaking. A central bank is independent if, in setting monetary policy, it can pursue its own
macro-economic objectives without interference by the fiscal authorities. In that case,
macroeconomic policies are decentralized over autonomous monetary and fiscal authorities.
2,3
How conservative a central bank is depends on the objectives of the monetary authorities:
A central bank is conservative if it attaches a high priority to price stability. Much of the literature
on central bank independence fails to distinguish between the two concepts of independence and
conservatism. It defines central bank independence in terms of the objectives of the monetary
authorities rather than the institutional setting in which monetary policy is set.
In this paper, we extend the work of Debelle (1993) on the link between fiscal and
monetary institutions. First, we provide more intuition. Second, we analyze how the level of money
holdings affects the interaction between policy authorities. In modern economies with highly
developed financial systems, money holdings tend to be quite small. The paper shows that a central
bank that is both independent and conservative tends to be rather attractive for such economies.
1 Exceptions are Sargent and Wallace (1981), Tabellini (1986), Alesina and Tabellini (1987), Levine and
Pearlman (1992), Levine (1993), Debelle and Fischer (1994), Krichel, Levine and Pearlman (1994) and
Levine and Brociner (1994).
2 Grilli, Masciandaro and Tabellini (1991) distinguish between political independence, the ability of the
central bank to choose its own economic policy objectives, and economic independence, the ability of the
central bank to make unrestricted use of monetary policy instruments to pursue its monetary policy goals
(see also Alesina and Grilli, 1992).
3 In the present paper the central bank is either completely dependent or completely independent. In
practice independence is often intermediate, which might be modeled by varying degrees of bargaining
power of the central bank relative to the fiscal authority. This, however, would be beyond the scope of the
current paper.2
As a third extension, we include nominal public debt into the model. In addition to
nominal wage contracts, nominal public debt provides an additional incentive for policymakers to
generate unanticipated inflation. In fact, the connection between central bank independence and the
level of public debt is a major issue in designing the institutional framework of the European
Monetary Union (EMU). To ensure price stability, the Maastricht Treaty not only includes
provisions that must guarantee the independence of the central bank but also puts ceilings on
public debt in the member countries. We find that high levels of public debt render an
independent, conservative central bank more attractive. In addition to holdings of money and
public debt, other structural features of the economy that affect the optimal design of monetary
institutions are distortions in labor- and output markets, the priority society attaches to high levels
of employment and public spending, and the nature of the policy game.
To analyze these issues, we formulate a game. The players in the private sector are a trade
union concluding nominal wage contracts and bondholders investing in public debt. The
policymakers in the public sector consist of a fiscal authority (or government) and a monetary
authority (or central bank). Private agents act as Stackelberg leaders vis-à-vis the policy authorities.
Hence, before policy is set, the private sector incorporates inflationary expectations in both
nominal labor contracts and the required nominal return on public debt. All private sector agents
hold the same, rational, expectations.
Both labor market distortions and distortionary output taxes reduce the level of
employment below its socially optimal level. Within this setting, policymakers who lack
commitment are tempted to adopt unanticipated inflation as an instrument to alleviate these
distortions. In particular, inflation plays three roles. First, it helps to reduce distortionary taxation
by generating seigniorage. Second, unanticipated inflation erodes the real value of outstanding
nominal public debt, thereby reducing the need to raise public revenues through distortionary
taxation. Third, unanticipated inflation boosts employment, thereby generating a first-order gain in
welfare. In a rational expectations equilibrium, the private sector anticipates the incentives facing
the policy authorities to generate unanticipated inflation. Hence, the second and third motives for
inflation turn out to be self-defeating. Accordingly, only the first role of inflation, i.e. generating
seigniorage, is socially useful in equilibrium.
We use the model to perform both positive and normative analysis. In a positive vein,
inflation, output, and government spending are compared across various institutional regimes. In
particular, we explore how the macroeconomic consequences of discretionary policies differ from
policy outcomes when authorities are able to commit. Furthermore, assuming that the objectives of
central and decentralized policymakers coincide, we investigate how centrally determined3
macroeconomic policy differs from the case in which policymaking is decentralized with an
independent central bank controlling monetary policy and the fiscal authorities determining taxes
and public spending. Depending on how decentralized fiscal and monetary authorities interact, we
investigate three non-cooperative games, namely Nash, Stackelberg with monetary authorities as
leader, and Stackelberg with fiscal authorities as leader.
In a normative vein, we compare society’s welfare across the various regimes, assuming
that the objectives of the policymakers coincide with those of society. We find that, except for the
case with monetary leadership, decentralization of discretionary monetary and fiscal policy raises
society’s welfare if money holdings are small, nominal public debt is large, and society attaches a
high priority to price stability. These three factors may all have contributed to the tendency in
recent years to delegate monetary policy to more independent central banks.
In the absence of commitment, decentralizing policy thus can raise welfare compared to
centralized policymaking although, in contrast to central policy authorities, an independent central
bank fails to internalize the government budget constraint. Intuitively, in a second best world with
pre-existing distortions, the introduction of an additional distortion may actually enhance welfare.
In particular, the distortion due to the failure to internalize the government budget constraint offsets
distortions due to a lack of commitment.
Decentralization may also facilitate commitment of monetary policy. Hence, we explore
how decentralization under commitment differs from centralization under discretion. In this way,
we compare welfare losses due to the failure of an independent central bank to internalize the
government budget constraint with the losses due to the lack of commitment of centralized
authorities. Irrespective of the particular non-cooperative game between the decentralized
authorities, granting independence to the central bank raises welfare if money holdings are low,
nominal public debt is large, and society attaches a high priority to price stability.
Objective functions of the fiscal and monetary authorities can differ from each other and
from the objectives of society. This brings us to the issue of how conservative central banks should
be. Rogoff (1985) has shown that, in order to (partially) overcome commitment problems, society
may find it optimal to delegate monetary policy to policy authorities that attach a higher priority to
price stabilization than society does. Intuitively, distorting the preferences of the central bank
offsets the distortion due to the absence of commitment. We extend Rogoff’s analysis by exploring
how, in various institutional settings, society can improve welfare by distorting the preferences of
the policy authorities. We find that, in the absence of commitment, it is typically optimal for the
weight that the authorities determining monetary policies attach to inflation to exceed the
corresponding weight of society. With monetary leadership, the central bank4
internalizes the government budget constraint. Hence, the inflation weight of the central bank
exceeds that of the society for two reasons: the incentive to stimulate employment and the
incentive to reduce the value of nominal public debt. If the fiscal and monetary authority move
simultaneously, the central bank does not internalize the government budget constraint. In that
case, the central bank does not need to be as conservative as with monetary leadership. However, it
still needs to be more conservative than society if money balances are small, as is the case for
modern economies. Under fiscal leadership, the preferences of not only the monetary but also the
fiscal authorities need to be distorted. In particular, the fiscal authority should be more inflation
averse than the central bank. Alternatively, the priority that the fiscal authorities attaches to public
spending should be reduced below that of society.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. In
Section 3, monetary and fiscal policies are set centrally by the government. A central policymaker
with unlimited access to lump-sum taxation can attain the first best, irrespective of whether or not
he is able to commit monetary policy. Hence, the limited availability of lump-sum taxation is the
ultimate source of the credibility problems associated with the (self-defeating) incentives to reduce
the real value of nominal contracts through unanticipated inflation (see Alesina and Tabellini
(1987)). In the absence of lump-sum taxation, the second-best allocation is attained when
commitment of monetary policy is feasible. In the absence of both commitment and lump-sum
taxation, the economy suffers from an inflation bias due to the self-defeating incentives to use
unanticipated inflation as an instrument to boost employment and reduce the real burden of
financing nominal public debt. Section 4 turns to an institutional setting in which monetary and
fiscal policy are decentralized. Section 5 concludes the main text of the paper.
2. The model
The sole objective of unions is to achieve a target real wage rate, the logarithm of which
we normalize to zero (for similar approaches, see Alesina and Tabellini (1987), Debelle (1993),
Eijffinger and Schaling (1993) and Jensen (1994)). Therefore, the (log) of the nominal wage rate is
set equal to the (rationally) expected (log) price level, p
e. Nominal wage contracts are signed
before policy is selected. Unions thus act as Stackelberg leaders vis-à-vis the authorities.
Output is given byY=L
h , where L is labor. Output is taxed at a rate t. The representative
firm selects employment so as to maximize profits PL
h(1-t)-WL, where P and W denote price level
and the wage rate, respectively. Hence, (log) output is given by y = (h/(1-h))(p-p
e-t+logh), where
p is the inflation rate and p
e the expected inflation rate. For5
convenience, we normalize output by subtracting the constant (h/(1-h))logh from y. Without any
consequences for our main results, we set h=½. Normalized output, x, thus amounts to
x=p - p
e - t . (2.1)
In addition to distortionary output taxes, we allow for other, non-tax, distortions due to, for
example, union power in the labor market or monopoly power in commodity markets. Without tax
distortions, x=0 in a rational expectations equilibrium (where inflation is anticipated, i.e. p=p
e, see
(2.1)). The first-best output level, i.e. output with neither tax nor non-tax distortions, is denoted by
˜ x. Thus, ˜ x>0 measures the non-tax distortions and can be interpreted as an implicit tax on output.
In fact, by offsetting the implicit output tax, an output subsidy (t=-˜ x) can raise output towards its
first-best level ˜ x.
Society features a social welfare function that differs from the objectives of the unions,
because the social welfare function accounts for the preferences of both workers and non-workers.
Society’s preferences, defined over inflation, output and public spending, are represented by the
following loss function,
VS =½[ a p Sp
2+ (x-˜ x)
2 + agS (g-˜ g)
2], apS,agS>0. (2.2)
Welfare losses increase in the deviations of inflation, (log) output and government spending (g is
government spending as a share of non-distortionary output) from their targets (or first-best levels
or ’bliss points’).
4 The target level of inflation corresponds to price stability. The non-distortionary
output level, ˜ x, represents the bliss point for output. The first-best level of government spending, ˜ g,
can be interpreted as the optimal share of non-distortionary output to be spent on public goods if
(non-distortionary) lump-sum taxes would be available. Parameters apS and agS correspond to the
weights of the inflation and government spending objectives, respectively, relative to the weight of
the output objective. Only relative weights matter for the outcomes. The limiting case of agS®¥
corresponds to the situation where government spending is exogenously fixed at ˜ g.
Preferences of the fiscal and monetary authorities are given by, respectively,
4 Employment is directly related to output through the production function. Hence, instead of output,
employment could have been included as an argument in the loss functions, with the target employment level
corresponding to the output level in absence of any distortions.6
VF =½[ a p Fp
2+ (x-˜ x)
2 + agF (g-˜ g)
2], apF,agF>0. (2.3)
and
VM =½[ a p Mp
2+ (x-˜ x)
2 + agM (g-˜ g)
2], apM,agM>0. (2.4)
The preference weights may differ both between the two policymakers and from the corresponding
weights of the social welfare function. In contrast to Debelle (1993), who assumes that the
monetary authority does not care about government spending, we allow for a potentially non-zero
weight agM.
The government selects its policies subject to the government budget constraint
5,
g + (1+r)b+( 1 + r + p
e- p )d=t+kp + q, (2.5)
where r denotes the ex-ante real interest rate, b the outstanding stock of single-period indexed
government debt, d the initial real value of the single-period non-indexed government debt, q
lump-sum tax revenue (b, d and q are expressed as shares of non-distortionary output), and k³0 the
constant ratio of real money holdings and non-distortionary output.
6 Both b and d are assumed to
be non-negative. Accordingly, the government is a net debtor (except when b=d=0). Bondholders
are risk neutral and have access to outside investment opportunities with a net rate of return r.
Hence, the nominal interest rate on non-indexed debt should compensate investors for expected
inflation so that the nominal interest rate is r+p
e.
3. Centralized policymaking
This section assumes that a centralized policymaker controls all policy instruments. One
can interpret this case as that of a dependent central bank or of cooperation between fiscal and
monetary authorities who share the same objectives. Our analysis proceeds in three steps. We start
with a benevolent, centralized policymaker who has unlimited access to lump-sum taxes.
Irrespective of whether this policymaker is able to commit or not, this case yields zero welfare
losses and is thus called first best.
Subsequently, we restrict lump-sum taxation so that the government has to resort to
distortionary output taxes to finance its spending. If the policymaker can commit, the resulting
5 The government budget constraint is derived in appendix A.
6 Alesina and Tabellini (1987), Debelle (1993) and Jensen (1994), among others, assume that k=1.
However, as will become clear below, the value of k plays an important role in our analysis.7
equilibrium is second best. The third and final step is to consider the case with neither unlimited
lump-sum taxation nor commitment. If the use of lump-sum taxation is limited, the absence of
commitment results in additional welfare losses because the government is tempted to use
unanticipated inflation as an indirect instrument to alleviate tax distortions (see also Alesina and
Tabellini (1987)).
3.1. The first-best
Suppose, for the moment, that a benevolent policymaker can freely set lump-sum taxation
(as a share of non-distortionary output) q.
7 The dictator thus solves the Lagrangian over p,
8 t,g
and q:
£=½ [ a p S p
2+( p - p
e- t -˜ x)
2 + agS(g-˜ g)
2]+l [g+(1+r)(b+d)+(p
e-p)d-t-kp-q], (3.1)
where l is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the government budget constraint. The first-
order conditions
9 corresponding to p, t, g and q are, respectively,
apSp +( p - p
e- t -˜ x)= (k+d)l, (3.2)
-(p-p
e-t-˜ x) = l, (3.3)
agS(˜ g-g) = l, (3.4)
l = 0. (3.5)
Imposing the condition of rational expectations (i.e. p
e=p), we can rewrite the government budget
constraint (2.5) as
˜ F º ˜ g + (1+r)(b+d) + ˜ x=[ t +˜ x ]+[ kp]+[ ˜ g-g] + q. (2.5¢)
We refer to ˜ Fa st h e(government) financing requirement. It amounts to the government spending
target ˜ g, debt servicing costs, (1+r)(b+d), and a labor subsidy aimed at offsetting the implicit tax
on output, ˜ x. Nominal and real debt affect the financing requirement in the same way because all
7 We assume that the optimal lump-sum tax does not exceed production. Hence, q£1.
8 The inflation rate equals the nominal money supply growth rate. Hence, the inflation rate can be taken
as being under direct control of the policymaker.
9 Throughout the paper, the linear-quadratic structure of the model ensures that the optimal policy choice
is the unique solution to the first-order conditions.8
inflation is anticipated in equilibrium due to rational expectations. The last right-hand side of (2.5)
represents the sources of finance: explicit and implicit tax revenues, t+˜ x, seigniorage revenues, kp,
the shortfall of government spending from its target, ˜ g-g, and lump-sum taxes, q.
If the government has unlimited access to lump-sum taxes, it covers its entire financing
requirement through these taxes. Accordingly, optimal policy is given by p=0, t=-˜ x, g=˜ g and q=˜ F
(impose p
e=p on (3.2) and (3.3)). All distortions are eliminated: non-tax market failures in the
output and labor markets are offset by output subsidies, prices are stable, and government spending
is set at its target level. In the absence of any welfare losses, the resulting equilibrium is first best.
In this case, commitment does not provide any value added over discretion. Intuitively, in a first-
best world, the government has no need to use unanticipated inflation as an indirect instrument to
alleviate market failures.
3.2. The second-best: commitment with limited access to lump-sum taxation
From now on, we assume that the government can use only a limited, exogenous amount
of lump-sum taxes q,
10 which is strictly less than the government financing requirement ˜ F. Hence,
the modified government financing requirement (or, in the following, simply "government
financing requirement") becomes
˜ K º ˜ F-q =[ t +˜ x ]+[ kp]+[ ˜ g-g]. (2.5²)
With commitment, the government minimizes (2.2) subject to (2.1), (2.5) and the rational-
expectations restriction p
e=p, for given q. The Lagrangian is,
£=½ [ a p Sp
2+( t +˜ x)
2 + agS(g-˜ g)
2]+l [g+(1+r)(b+d)-t-kp-q]. (3.6)
The first-order conditions for p, t and g, respectively, yield:
apSp = kl, (3.7)
t+˜ x=l , (3.8)
agS(˜ g-g) = l. (3.9)
10 The restriction on lump-sum taxation can be interpreted as reflecting distributional concerns. The more
a society cares about an equal income distribution, the less lump-sum taxes it would want to use. If
inequality aversion is high enough, lump-sum taxes may actually be negative, thereby expanding the
government financing requirement.9
Eliminating l, we arrive at:
kp =( k
2/ a p S )[ t +˜ x], (3.10)
˜ g-g = (1/agS)[ t +˜ x]. (3.11)
We can combine (3.10) and (3.11) with (2.5²) to obtain the equilibrium policy outcomes, which
are presented in Table 1. Table 1 contains also an expression for society’s welfare loss.
If available lump-sum taxes would suffice to cover the government financing requirement
(i.e., q=˜ Fo r˜ K=0), the first-best would be reached. Hence, welfare losses originate in the limited
access to lump-sum taxation. The larger the part of the government financing requirement that
cannot be financed by lump-sum taxation, ˜ K, the larger welfare losses become. In particular, a
higher ˜ K requires the government to levy higher distortionary taxes, thereby harming output.
Moreover, inflation rises in order to raise more seignorage, thereby causing stagflation. Finally,
government spending falls below its target level in order to reduce the need for distortionary
taxation and seignorage.
Accordingly, distortions are smoothed out over the three sources of financing, because
marginal welfare losses are increasing in the level of each distortion. Therefore, countries with
serious labor market distortions (i.e., ˜ x is high) rely less on explicit taxes and more on seigniorage
while government spending is crowded out. Also a higher stock of government debt raises the
government financing requirement. This increases distortionary taxation, which hurts output
through adverse supply-side effects. In addition, more government debt boosts inflation, hence
causing stagflation, and decreases government spending. In a similar way, a larger public spending
target yields stagflation.
In addition to the financing requirement, other structural features of the economy affect the
policy outcomes. Most modern economies feature low holdings of real base money (i.e., k®0), so
that seigniorage is of only minor importance as a source of government finance. Indeed, if money
holding are very small (k®0), inflation vanishes and [t+˜ x] and [˜ g-g] bear the entire burden of
meeting the financing requirement.
Another important determinant of the equilibrium are the relative priorities society attaches
to various objectives. To illustrate, an increase in weight attached to price stability, apS, reduces
inflation, but also raises distortionary taxation (and lowers government spending), thereby harming
employment. Hence, society faces a trade-off between output and inflation (a kind of "Phillips
curve"). If the spending weight, agS, increases, government spending rises, requiring more
seigniorage (and thus higher inflation) and higher output taxes.10
3.3. Discretion
If the government cannot commit, it attempts to use unanticipated inflation as an
instrument to erode the real values of nominal wage and debt contracts. This in order to expand
output and reduce the need for distortionary taxation. Under discretion, the government takes
inflation expectations as predetermined. The Lagrangian associated with the government’s
optimization problem thus becomes:
£=½ [ a p F p
2+( p - p
e- t -˜ x)
2 + agS(g-˜ g)
2]+l [g+(1+r)(b+d)+(p
e-p)d-t-kp-q]. (3.12)
In principle, the price-stability weight of the fiscal authority, apF, may differ from that of society,
apS.
Inflation, taxes, and spending
The first order condition for the level of government spending is the same as under
commitment (see (3.9)). The first order conditions for the inflation rate and the tax rate now
become, respectively,
apFp +( p - p
e- t -˜ x )=( k +d)l, (3.13)
-(p-p
e-t-˜ x) = l. (3.14)
Compared with the corresponding first-order condition under commitment (3.7), equation
(3.13) reveals that, for predetermined inflation expectations, inflation yields two additional benefits.
First, unanticipated inflation erodes the real value of public debt, thereby reducing the government
financing requirement and hence the need for distortionary taxes. Second, an unanticipated increase
in inflation boosts employment by eroding the value of real wages. Combining (3.13) and (3.14)
and imposing p
e=p, we find the relation between seigniorage and output-tax revenues:
kp =[ k ( k +d+1)/apF][t+˜ x]. (3.15)
Comparison of (3.15) with (3.10) (assuming that apS=apM) reveals that the share of seigniorage in
government revenues is higher under discretion than under commitment because inflation appears
more attractive as an instrument to reduce the real value of nominal contracts.11
Substitution of (3.11) and (3.15) into (2.5²) yields the equilibrium policy outcomes, which
are contained in Table 1. If preferences of the government and society coincide (apF=apS and
agF=agS) and k>0, inflation, seigniorage, and public spending are higher while taxes are lower
under discretion than under commitment (see Table 2). Hence, discretion suffers from an inflation
bias due to the self-defeating temptation to use unanticipated inflation to erode nominal contracts.
Welfare
The inability to precommit harms welfare. Subtracting welfare under commitment from the
corresponding expression under discretion (see Table 1), one finds the value of commitment. This
value rises with the financing requirement, ˜ K, and the outstanding amount of nominal public debt.
Optimal preferences
Welfare losses due to the absence of commitment can be eliminated if the price-stability
weight of the government can be adjusted.
11 The optimal weight is set such that the share of
seigniorage relative to t+˜ x coincides with the corresponding share under commitment. Combining
(3.10) and (3.15), we find for the optimal inflation weight,
apF
opt =( k +d+1)apS/k,o ra p F
opt/apS = 1 + (d+1)/k. (3.16)
For apF
opt, policy outcomes coincide with those under commitment (given agF=agS). The optimal
inflation weight exceeds society’s true inflation weight for two reasons: the incentive to stimulate
employment by reducing real wage costs through unanticipated inflation and the incentive to
reduce the real value of the outstanding nominal debt through unanticipated inflation. Both
incentives are anticipated by the private sector and hence futile in equilibrium. To offset these self-
defeating incentives, policymakers need to attach a higher weight to price stability. Intuitively, in a
second best world with pre-existing distortions, introducing another distortion may be welfare
improving.
The optimal mark-up on the true price-stability weight depends on the strength of the self-
defeating roles of inflation, as measured by d+1, relative to the socially useful role, as measured by
k. Technological advances in financial markets have reduced real money holdings, k. At the same
11 See also Rogoff (1985). In Rogoff’s model welfare losses can not be eliminated entirely because of
stochastic shocks. From the point of view of society’s welfare, a central bank that is more conservative than
society does not respond properly to shocks. Hence, there is a trade off between credibility and flexibility.
See also Lohmann (1992). However, Persson and Tabellini (1992) and Walsh (1993) argue that an optimal
contract between the government and the central bank can eliminate the trade-off between credibility and
flexibility.12
time, public debt ratios, d, have increased due to fiscal imbalances. These two developments may
explain why policymakers have become more conservative in recent years.
4. Decentralization of fiscal and monetary policy
In this section, macroeconomic policy is decentralized. The government sets the tax rate
and the level of government spending, while an independent central bank selects the inflation rate
by controlling monetary policy. We explore three policy games: a Nash game in which
policymakers simultaneously select policies and two Stackelberg games in which either the fiscal
or monetary authorities act as leader.
4.1. Central bank and government play Nash
Commitment
The central bank selects the inflation rate to minimize (2.4) subject to (2.1) and p
e=p,
taking as given the instruments controlled by the fiscal authorities (i.e. the tax rate and government
spending). Similarly, the fiscal authority sets its instruments by minimizing (2.3) subject to (2.1)
and (2.5), taking the inflation rate as given. Table 1 provides the expressions for the policy
outcomes and society’s welfare loss.
Inflation, taxes, and public spending
Compared with centralized policymaking under commitment (i.e. the second best, see
section 3.2), inflation and government spending are lower while taxes are higher. In fact, the Nash
equilibrium yields the zero inflation rule studied by Jensen (1994). Intuitively, with decentralized
policymaking, the central bank does not internalize the government budget constraint and thus fails
to account for the social value of seigniorage.
The welfare losses due to this distortion rise with the size of the base of the inflation tax as
indicated by the inverse of velocity, k. The second best is approached in modern economies with
small holdings of base money (i.e. k®0) as the seigniorage motive for inflation vanishes.13
Welfare
Decentralization is likely to facilitate commitment because the central banker can be held
directly responsible for deviations from a given rule for inflation.
12 Hence, we provide a welfare
comparison with centralized policymaking under discretion (assuming apM=apF=apS and agF=agS).
Welfare losses are lowest under Nash (with commitment) if and only if (see Appendix B),
(4.1) 2 æ
ç
è
ö
÷
ø
k
k d 1
k
2
apS(1 a
1
gS)
<1 .
The welfare comparison depends on two elements. The first term at the left-hand side of
(4.1), which is a decreasing function of (d+1)/k, reflects the relative importance of the distortions
under, respectively, centralized and decentralized policymaking. Decentralized policymaking is
attractive if the distortion under decentralized policymaking due to the failure of the central bank
to internalize the government budget constraint (indicated by k) is small compared to the
distortions under centralized policymaking due to the absence of commitment (indicated by the
term d+1).
The objectives of society are the second determinant of the welfare comparison and affect
the left-hand side of (4.1) through the second term. In particular, if society attaches a low priority
to price stability (as indicated by a small weight, apS) but a high priority to public spending (as
indicated by a large weight, agS), decentralized policymaking, which delivers price stability but
reduces seigniorage revenues and hence public spending, becomes less attractive. In equilibrium,
this trade off between public spending and price stability becomes less important if small real
balances make inflation an insignificant source of seigniorage. Indeed, if money balances vanish
(i.e. k®0), the second term approaches zero.
An alternative interpretation of (4.1) is that it compares the benefits and costs of
decentralization. The benefit is the absence of self-defeating incentives to inflate, which is
especially important if society is rather inflation-averse and nominal public debt is large. The cost
of decentralization amounts to the loss of seigniorage revenues, which is large if k is large and
society attaches a high priority to public spending and employment. The increased tendency to
decentralize fiscal and monetary policy can be explained by the decreasing costs (due to a smaller
base of the inflation tax as reflected in a small value for k) and increasing benefits (due to large
stocks of public debt and an increased aversion against inflation).
12 The example of New Zealand is instructive in this respect. The central bank law requires the governor
of the central bank and the minister of finance to establish public inflation targets. The central bank governor
is personally accountable for failure to meet these targets. For more on this example, see e.g. Lohmann
(1995).14
Discretion
Under discretion, the central bank minimizes (2.4) subject to (2.1), taking as given not only
the tax rate and government spending but also the expected inflation rate, p
e. The reaction function
of the central bank thus amounts to:
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(4.2)
Higher expected inflation, higher taxes or more non-tax labor market distortions induce the
monetary authority to raise inflation in order to protect employment.
The government minimizes (2.3) over g and t, subject to (2.1) and (2.5), taking both p and
p
e as given. The government’s reaction functions are
(4.3)
(4.4)
To interpret these reaction functions, we rewrite the government budget constraint as [˜ K+(p
e-
p)(d+1)-kp]=[ t +˜ x+p
e-p]+[ ˜ g-g] + (p
e-p)d. The left hand side of the equation, which appears at
the right-hand sides of both (4.3) and (4.4), represents the residual government financing
requirement of the fiscal authorities, i.e. the financing requirement left for the fiscal authorities
after taking into account seigniorage and the impact of inflation surprises (i.e.p
e-p) on debt service
and output. If agS®¥, the entire burden of residual finance falls on taxes as government spending
is fixed at ˜ g.
Expression (4.4) reveals that unanticipated inflation (i.e., p>p
e) raises government
spending. Intuitively, surprise inflation reduces real debt service and, by eroding real wages, boosts
employment, thereby reducing the need to subsidize output. This leaves more room for public
spending.
Equilibrium policy outcomes, together with society’s welfare losses, are provided in Table
1. These outcomes are found by combining (4.2)-(4.4) with the government budget constraint and
the requirement that expectations be rational (p
e=p).
13 The public-spending weight of the monetary authorities is irrelevant in this case.15
Inflation, taxes, and public spending
Whether inflation under decentralized policymaking with discretion is higher than in the
second best (i.e. centralized policymaking with commitment, see section 3.2) depends on real
money balances. In particular, if k is smaller than unity, inflation is highest with decentralization
(assuming that apM=apS and agF=agS). Intuitively, under Nash discretion, inflation is used as an
instrument to boost employment. Under centralized policymaking with commitment, in contrast,
inflation only acts as an instrument to raise seigniorage. If money holdings are small (i.e. k is
smaller than unity), the tax base for seigniorage is narrow. Hence, the seigniorage argument for
inflation in the second best is outweighed by its role in stimulating output and employment under
decentralization. If k=1 (as, e.g. in Debelle, 1993), the seigniorage and employment incentives for
inflation balance each other. Accordingly, Nash discretion coincides with the second best.
Given decentralized policymaking, we can compare policy outcomes also between
commitment and discretion. As with centralized policymaking, inflation and public spending are
highest while taxes are lowest under discretion (see Table 2). In contrast to the case with
centralized policymaking, the incentives to reduce debt service are not relevant because an
independent central bank does not internalize the government budget constraint. Accordingly, with
decentralized policymaking, the inflation bias originates only in the self-defeating incentives to
boost employment.
Finally, we can compare decentralized and centralized policymaking under discretion.
Centralized policymaking produces the highest inflation; in contrast to an independent central bank,
a central policymaker internalizes the government budget constraint and thus uses inflation not
only to boost employment but also to raise seigniorage and reduce debt service. If k=d=0, these
two additional motives for inflation are absent so that decentralization produces the same outcomes
as centralized policymaking.16
Welfare
Decentralization under discretion generally results in additional welfare losses compared to
centralization under commitment (i.e. the second best) unless k=1. The reason is that decentralized
policymaking and discretion cause two additional distortions. First, an independent central bank
does not internalize the government budget constraint. Second, the loss of commitment produces
self-defeating incentives for inflation. If k=1, the two distortions exactly offset each other.
If decentralized policymakers play Nash, commitment is preferred to discretion if and only
if (see Appendix D),
(4.5)
This inequality looks similar to (4.1) except that the first term on the left-hand side does
not depend on d. The reason is that with decentralized policymaking the central bank does not
attempt to reduce the real value of nominal debt. This in contrast to a centralized policymaker who
internalizes the government budget constraint.
Unless k is rather small, commitment is less attractive than discretion -- even for the
central bank. Intuitively, decentralization distorts policymaking because the independent central
bank fails to internalize the seigniorage motive for inflation. Hence, under decentralized
policymaking, discretion plays a useful social role by providing an incentive for the central bank to
tolerate inflation, thereby offsetting the distortions due to the failure of the central bank to
internalize the government budget constraint. Only if the contribution of inflation to seigniorage is
small (because real balances and hence the base of the inflation tax is small) or society cares a lot
about price stability and little about public spending, does the commitment equilibrium, which
produces the lowest inflation and public spending, yield the highest welfare.
Assuming that commitment is not possible, we can compare welfare under decentralization
with that under centralization. If either k or d is positive, decentralized policymaking yields highest
welfare if and only if (see Appendix F),
(4.6)
Decentralization becomes more attractive with a large stock of outstanding nominal debt
and a small stock of money. The reason is that decentralization removes both the self-defeating
incentive to reduce the real value of nominal debt and the socially useful motive to raise
seigniorage. If holdings of nominal debt are large compared to those of money, the futile motive17
(reducing debt service) dominates the non-futile one (raising seigniorage). Hence, by eliminating
both motives, decentralization enhances welfare.
The three inequalities (4.1), (4.5) and (4.6) can be used to find the welfare ranking
contained in Table 2, where k
*, k
** and k
*** are the values of k for which (4.1), (4.5) and (4.6),
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respectively, are met with equality. For very small money holdings (i.e. for k<k
**), decentralized
policymaking with commitment yields highest welfare while losses are highest under centralized
policymaking with discretion. Intuitively, with small real balances, inflation does not play any
useful social role so that the welfare ranking of the various equilibria depends on their performance
in ensuring price stability. For intermediate money holdings (i.e. for k
**<k<k
***), decentralization
with discretion is best. Finally, for sufficiently large k (k<k
***), centralization under discretion is
better than decentralized discretion, which in turn is better than Nash commitment.
Optimal preference weights
Rather than decentralizing policy, properly changing the preference weights of
policymakers is another way to deal with the distortions due to the absence of commitment.
Altering the weights of the monetary authorities may well be possible only if the central bank is
independent. In practice, decentralization might make it easier to hold the central bank responsible
for the resulting inflationary rate. This would provide another argument in favor of
decentralization. The second best is reached when the central bank’s price-stability weight is:
apM
opt ºa p S / k . (4.7)
The central bank should be more conservative than society (i.e. apM
opt exceeds apS)i f
money holdings are small (i.e. k < 1). Intuitively, with small real balances, the failure of an
independent central bank to internalize the seigniorage motive for inflation is less important than
the temptation to use inflation as a futile instrument to boost employment. To reduce the
temptation to use unanticipated inflation, the central bank should be made more conservative.
With decentralized policymaking, the central bank does not have to be as conservative as
under centralization (compare (4.7) with (3.16)) because an independent central bank does not
internalize the government budget constraint and hence does not raise inflation to aid the public
finances.
14 It can be shown that k
* (Appendix C), k
** (Appendix E) and k
*** (Appendix G) are unique.18
4.2. Monetary leadership
In this subsection, we consider a Stackelberg game with the central bank as the leader. The
central bank is leader if it selects the inflation rate before the government chooses the tax rate and
the level of public spending. This game structure is most likely if, compared to the fiscal
authorities, the central bank can react more swiftly to new situations. We assume throughout this
subsection that the fiscal authority and society attach the same weight to public spending ( i.e.
agF=agS).
Commitment
If the central bank is Stackelberg leader, it minimizes (2.4) subject to not only (2.1) and
the rational expectations constriction p=p
e but also the fiscal authority’s reaction functions (4.3)
and (4.4). Table 1 contains the expressions for the equilibrium policy outcomes and society’s
welfare loss.
If the objectives of the central bank and society coincide, the second best is reached.
Unlike in the Nash game, the monetary authorities internalize the government budget constraint by
taking into account the reaction functions of the fiscal authorities. Hence, the central bank accounts
for the social value of inflation in generating seigniorage. Secondly, through the ability to commit,
any self-defeating incentives for inflation are avoided.
If the central bank attaches a smaller weight to government spending than society does, not
only are inflation and government spending lower than in the second best, but also taxes are higher
(provided that k>0). Intuitively, a smaller spending weight implies a higher priority for price
stability. Hence, the central bank reduces inflation. The resulting increase in the residual financing
requirement due to a decline in seigniorage induces the fiscal authorities not only to cut spending
but also to raise output taxes (see (4.3) and (4.4)).
Discretion
With discretion, the central bank solves the same problem as under commitment, except
that it now takes p
e as predetermined. Just as is the case with commitment, policy outcomes
coincide with those under centralization if the preferences of the authorities are the same as
society’s preferences (see Table 1). For the reasons discussed in Sections 3.3 and 4.1, inflation and
government spending are higher and taxes lower than in the second best or the Nash case.19
Since the equilibrium coincides with centralized discretion, we can use (4.6) for a welfare
comparison with Nash discretion. The benefit from leadership is that the seigniorage motive for
inflation is internalized. The cost is, that by internalizing the government budget constraint, the
central bank is tempted to reduce the real value of nominal public debt through unanticipated
inflation. While the size of the benefit depends on money holdings, nominal debt determines how
large the costs are. Hence, if d is large compared to k, the costs dominate the benefits and the
central bank loses from leadership (i.e. (4.6) is met in that case). Indeed, in a second-best world,
removing one distortion (i.e. the failure to internalize the government budget constraint) may
worsen another (i.e. the lack of commitment).
If the preferences of the central bank coincide with society’s, commitment always makes
society better off. This contrasts with the Nash game, where the commitment equilibrium is not
second best because of the failure of the central bank to internalize the government budget
constraint. With monetary leadership this distortion is absent and hence discretion can not act as a
way to offset this distortion.
Optimal preference weights
As before, appropriate distortion of the central bank’s objectives achieves the second best.
Given that the central bank internalizes the government budget constraint, it is not surprising that
the optimal central bank’s price stability weight is the same as the corresponding weight of the
central policymaker (assuming that agM=agF=agS, compare (3.16)),
apM
opt =( k +d+1)apS/k,o ra p M
opt/apS = 1 + (d+1)/k. (4.8)
Instead of increasing the inflation weight of the central bank, society could also decrease the
government spending weight of the central bank (assuming that apM=apF=apS and agF=agS). The
spending weight of the monetary authorities does not distort the trade-off between spending and
taxes. Rather, a lower spending weight of the central bank reduces inflation. Given the resulting
residual financing requirement, the fiscal authorities implement the optimal mix between spending
and taxes as long as their spending weight coincides with that of society. In particular, the second
best can be attained if there exists a weight agM³0 such that,
(4.9) dº
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The existence of such a non-negative value for agM is more likely if money holdings are large and
nominal public debt is small. In that case, the inflation bias is relatively small and hence only a
slight adjustment in preferences is required.
4.3. Fiscal leadership
Compared to adjustments in monetary policy, changes in fiscal policy take more time due
to, for example, lengthy parliamentary procedures. Therefore, once fiscal policy variables have
been selected, they cannot be changed so easily before the central bank can react. The government
might be able to exploit this commitment to a given policy choice as a first-mover advantage vis-à-
vis the central bank.
Commitment
With commitment, the reaction function of the central bank is p = 0. Hence, it does not
react to fiscal policy and the policy outcomes are the same as those in the Nash (commitment)
case. With commitment, monetary leadership yields positive inflation while Nash and fiscal
leadership produce price stability. Zero inflation, however, yields no seigniorage. Hence, under
Nash and fiscal leadership, spending needs to be lower while output taxes must be higher than
under monetary leadership. If the policymakers’ preferences coincide with society’s, welfare is
highest under monetary leadership because the central bank internalizes the government budget
constraint and hence accounts for the social value of inflation in generating seigniorage.
Discretion
The fiscal authority minimizes (2.3) over t and g, subject to (2.1), (2.5) and the central
bank’s reaction function (4.2).
Inflation, taxes, and public spending
Assuming that the preferences of the policymakers coincide with those of society (i.e.
apM=apF=apS and agF=agS), we compare the various discretionary equilibria contained in Table 1
and ranked in Table 2. First, we compare fiscal leadership with Nash. If government spending is
exogenous (i.e. agS®¥), the fiscal authority must set the tax rate so as to cover the residual21
financing requirement (see (4.3)). Hence, it cannot use the tax rate strategically. This implies that
the two equilibria coincide.
If government spending is endogenous, fiscal leadership yields higher inflation, taxes and
government spending than in the Nash case (as long as k+d is positive). Hence, higher seigniorage
is used to raise spending rather than cut taxes. The reason for this spending bias is that the fiscal
authority uses higher taxes to induce the central bank to internalize the government budget
constraint (see (4.2)). This strategic use of the tax instrument implies a spending bias in that the
trade-off between lower taxes (or higher output) and higher spending is distorted in favor of higher
spending (while under Nash, (˜ g-g)/(t+˜ x) is equal to its socially optimal value agS
-1, it is smaller
than that value under fiscal leadership, namely agS
-1(1+apS)/(1+apS+k+d). The difference between
Nash and fiscal leadership increases in k+d. This factor represents the inflation motives involving
the government budget constraint, namely raising seigniorage and reducing the real burden of
servicing nominal debt. These are the motives the central bank fails to internalize.
We can compare fiscal leadership also with monetary leadership (which is equivalent to
centralized decision making). Just as under commitment, inflation is lowest under fiscal leadership
(see Appendix N.1). Intuitively, under monetary leadership, the central bank takes into account the
value of inflation in relaxing the government budget constraint. With fiscal leadership, the fiscal
authorities use higher taxes strategically to encourage the independent central bank to do so.
However, as noted in the previous paragraph, this behavior distorts the level of public spending.
The associated costs induce the fiscal authority to go less far in forcing the central bank to inflate
more than in the case of a dependent central bank. Due to the strategic use of the tax instrument,
taxes are higher under fiscal than under monetary leadership (see Appendix N.2).
With higher taxes and lower inflation (and thus seigniorage), fiscal leadership may produce
both higher and lower public spending than monetary leadership. In particular, public spending is
higher under fiscal leadership if k<1 and lower if k>1 (see Appendix N.3). Intuitively, with small
money holdings, lower inflation under fiscal leadership produces only little loss of seigniorage.
Hence, the effect of higher output taxes dominates and fiscal leadership results in higher spending.
Table 2 compares the discretionary policy outcomes for the three objectives of policy (i.e.
stable prices, employment, and public spending) under the three decentralized games. Due to the
failure of the central bank to internalize the government budget constraint, inflation is lowest under
Nash. The lack of seigniorage revenues results in the worst spending performance. Monetary
leadership, in contrast, yields the highest inflation since the central bank accounts fully for the
impact of inflation on the government budget constraint. The associated seigniorage revenues allow
for the lowest output taxes. As far as inflation is concerned, fiscal leadership is an intermediate22
case as the government budget constraint is internalized only partially through the strategic use of
higher taxes by the fiscal authorities. This strategic use implies that output taxes and spending (if k
< 1) are highest under fiscal leadership. Overall, output and employment are highest under
monetary leadership, inflation is lowest under Nash, and (if k<1) spending is highest under fiscal
leadership.
Welfare
Turning to welfare analysis, we first compare welfare under discretion with that under
commitment (assuming that apM=apF=apS and agF=agS).
15 In general, commitment is preferable if
(see Appendix H):
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In line with the earlier comparison between discretion and commitment for Nash (see (4.5)),
commitment is preferred if money balances are small (in particular, if 2k+k
2/apS<1) while
discretion is more attractive if money balances are large and nominal public debt is small (in
particular, if 2k+k
2/apS>1+(d+1)
2/apS).
16 Debelle (1993) considers the special case with zero
nominal public debt (i.e. d=0) and relatively large money holdings (i.e. k=1). In that case,
discretion is unambiguously better than commitment.
The difficulty in welfare comparisons involving fiscal leadership is that additional welfare
losses arise from the government spending bias. Therefore, in comparing fiscal leadership (without
commitment) with Nash (without commitment), we explore various special cases. As noted above,
both equilibria coincide if government spending is exogenous or if k=d=0. If money holdings
become very small, the social value of inflation in generating seigniorage vanishes. Hence, Nash,
which delivers lower inflation, is unambiguously better (provided that d>0, see appendix J). If
money holdings are very large, in contrast, fiscal leadership yields highest welfare. Apparently, the
welfare loss from the strategic use of the tax instrument is outweighed by gains due to additional
seigniorage.
Finally, we compare welfare under fiscal and monetary leadership for various special cases.
If k=d=0, both equilibria coincide (and coincide with Nash). With zero money holdings and a
positive stock of nominal debt, fiscal leadership yields highest welfare (see Appendix K).
15 If government spending is exogenous (agS®¥) or if money and nominal debt holdings are zero, fiscal
leadership coincides with Nash, so that the welfare comparison is as in discussed earlier in (4.5).
16 There exists a unique k for which (4.10) is met (Appendix I).23
Intuitively, under fiscal leadership inflation is lower and, therefore, closer to the socially optimal
rate (which is zero if k=0). The better performance on price stability dominates the welfare losses
due to the spending bias. If money holdings are very large, monetary leadership is unambiguously
better (see Appendix L). As noted above, fiscal leadership coincides with Nash if public spending
is exogenous. In that case, therefore, (4.6) provides the welfare comparison between fiscal and
monetary leadership. Hence, fiscal leadership is best with low money holdings and large stocks of
outstanding nominal public debt.
Optimal preference weights
To attain the second best under fiscal leadership, society needs to distort the preference
weights of not only the monetary but also the fiscal authorities:
apM = apS/k, (4.11)
apF =( k +d+1)apS/k. (4.12)
The adjustment in the central bank’s preferences ensures that the incentive to boost
employment yields the optimal amount of seigniorage. In addition, the fiscal authority’s inflation
weight needs to be reduced in order to eliminate the self-defeating inflationary incentives.
The adjustment of the monetary preferences corresponds to that under Nash (compare
(4.11) with (4.7)). Fiscal preferences are adjusted in the same way as under centralized
policymaking (or monetary leadership, compare (4.12) with (3.16) and (4.8)). This confirms that
fiscal leadership, where the fiscal authorities use the tax instrument strategically to induce the
central bank to internalize the government budget constraint, is an intermediate case between Nash,
where the central bank does not internalize the government budget constraint at all, and monetary
leadership, where the central bank fully internalizes that constraint.
According to (4.11) and (4.12), the fiscal authority should be more conservative than the
monetary authority. This may be difficult to achieve in practice. An alternative solution would be
to distort the government’s preferences for spending (given apF=apS). In particular, the second-best
is established if:
apM = apS/k, (4.13)
(4.14) agF agS
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Hence, to eliminate the spending bias due to the strategic use of higher taxes, the fiscal
authority’s public spending weight needs to be reduced. The required adjustment depends only on
k+d, representing the public-finance motives for inflation that the central bank neglects.
Institutional constraints may prevent society from distorting the objective function of the
fiscal authorities. Appendix M demonstrates that, starting from centralized policymaking, society
improves its welfare by delegating monetary policy to an independent policymaker with properly
adjusted preferences.
5. Conclusions
This paper has explored the macroeconomic implications of alternative institutions for
monetary and fiscal policymaking. It contributed to the literature on central bank independence by
stressing the various interactions between an independent central bank and fiscal policy. Within
such a setting, we investigated when delegating monetary policy to an independent central bank is
optimal. There is no need to decentralize monetary policy if central policymakers can commit or
have unlimited access to lump-sum taxation, or if the preference weights of the policymakers can
be properly adjusted.
With limited lump-sum taxation, lack of commitment, and fixed policy preferences,
decentralizing monetary policy may be called for. The potential benefit of decentralization is that it
introduces another distortion, namely the failure of monetary policy to internalize the government
budget constraint.
17 By reducing inflation, this distortion offsets another distortion, namely the
inflation bias due to the absence of commitment. Decentralization becomes more attractive if the
outstanding stock of nominal debt is large (in that case, the associated temptation facing
discretionary, centralized policy to reduce the real value of this stock produces a large inflation
bias), money holdings are small (in that case, seigniorage and hence the failure of decentralized
authorities to internalize the social value of inflation are not important), and society attaches high
priority to price stability (in that case, the lower inflation bias under decentralization is valued
highly). From a positive point of view, all these factors may have contributed to the recent
tendency towards granting more independence to central banks.
Society could deal with the absence of both commitment and unlimited lump-sum taxation
by properly distorting policymakers’ preferences away from the true preferences of society.
17 If the independent central bank is Stackelberg leader in the game with the fiscal authorities,
decentralizing policy does not help as the central bank indirectly internalizes the government budget
constraint by taking into account the reaction functions of the fiscal player.25
Changing preferences may be easier with decentralized policymakers. This makes decentralization
even more attractive. Of the various decentralized games we considered, Stackelberg with monetary
leadership yields the highest inflation bias while the Nash game produces lowest inflation.
Accordingly, the optimal weight the central bank attaches to price-stability is highest under
monetary leadership and lowest under Nash. As far as inflation is concerned, fiscal leadership is an
intermediate case between monetary leadership and Nash. In this case, not only monetary but also
fiscal preferences need to be distorted to achieve the second best.
Our analysis could be extended in a number ways. First, we assumed that real money
holdings were a constant fraction of (non-distortionary) output. This seems to be a reasonable
approximation for low or modest inflation rates. The arguments in favor of decentralization and
commitment would be reinforced if money holdings would depend on the (expected) inflation rate.
In that case, seigniorage as a share of government revenues would be lower, the larger the amount
of nominal public debt and hence the stronger the incentive for a surprise inflation. Second, the
introduction of stochastic shocks seems particularly important because it would allow us to explore
the trade-off between credibility and flexibility (see Lohmann (1992)). In particular, distorting
policy preferences, while yielding benefits in terms of enhanced credibility of low-inflation
policies, would become costly in terms of stabilizing shocks, i.e. flexibility. However, an optimal
contract between the government and the central bank may eliminate the trade-off between
credibility and flexibility (Persson and Tabellini, 1992, and Walsh, 1993). As a third extension, we
could introduce endogenous debt accumulation. In that case, society may find it optimal to change
not only the intra- but also the intertemporal trade-offs of policymaking. These extensions are left
for further research, however.
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Table 1: Equilibrium policies, welfare losses and optimal weights of the objective functions
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Table 1: Continued
Finance
source:
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Table 2: Ranking of policies, output and welfare losses across regimes
(objectives of policymakers and society coincide)
Variable k³0 Ranking
inflation (p)
0<k<1
k=1
k>1
N C=F C<M C=C<N D<F D<M D=D
N C=F C<M C=C=N D<F D<M D=D
N C=F C<N D<[ F D?M C=C ]<M D=D
tax rate (t)=
- output (x)
0<k<1
k=1
k>1
M D=D<N D<M C=C<N C=F C ;N D<F D
M D=D<N D=M C=C<[ F D?N C=F C ]
M D=D<M C=C<N D<[ F D?N C=F C ]
public spending (g)
0<k<1
k=1
k>1
N C=F C<M C=C<N D<D=M D<F D
N C=F C<M C=C=N D<D=M D=F D
N C=F C<N D<[ F D?M C=C ]<D=M D
welfare loss (L)
k=0
0<k<k
**
k=k
**
k
**<k<k
*
k=k
*
k
*<k<k
***
k=k
***
k>k
***
C=M C=N C=F C<N D<D=M D
C=M C<N C=F C<N D<D=M D
C=M C<N C=F C=N D<D=M D
C=M C£N D<N C=F C<D=M D
C=M C£N D<N C=F C=D=M D
C=M C£N D<D=M D<N C=F C
C=M C<N D=D=M D<N C=F C
C=M C<D=M D<N D<N C=F C
Notes: 1. C = centralized commitment; D = centralized discretion; NC = Nash commitment;
ND = Nash discretion; MC = monetary leadership commitment; MD = monetary
leadership discretion; FC = fiscal leadership commitment; FD = fiscal leadership
discretion.
2. A question mark ? indicates that it is not possible to unambiguously rank the two
alternatives.
3. k
*, k
** and k
*** are the values of k for which (4.1), (4.5) and (4.6), respectively, are
met with equality.30
Appendix A: Derivation of the government budget constraint
Real money balances in period t are given by Mt/Pt=k˜ X, where ˜ X is the (constant) output level in
absence of any distortions (the antilog of ˜ x). It follows immediately that (Mt-Mt-1)/Mt=(Pt-Pt-1)/Pt.
Lump-sum tax revenues are given by qtPt˜ X. Moreover, if distortions are not too large, distortionary
tax revenues can be approximated by ttPt˜ X.
18 In nominal terms, the government budget constraint
is
PtGt + (1+r1t)PtBt + (1+r2t)Pt-1Dt = ttPt˜ X+( M t -Mt-1)+P t(Bt+1+Dt+1)+q t P t˜ X,
where Gt is the level of government spending. Furthermore, Bt and Dt are the amounts of indexed
and non-indexed single-period public debt, respectively, sold at the end of the previous period
against price Pt-1 and interest rates r1t and r2t, respectively. Finally, (Mt-Mt-1) is the increase in the
nominal money supply. Dividing left and right hand side by Pt˜ X gives the government budget
constraint in shares of non-distortionary output:
gt + (1+r1t)bt + (1+r2t-pt)dt = tt + kpt +b t+1 +d t+1 + qt,
where ptº(Pt-Pt-1)/Pt and where we have approximated (1+r2t)Pt-1/Pt by (1+r2t-pt). For a risk neutral
investor, who has access to an outside investment opportunity against a constant net rate of return
r (the exogenous ex ante real interest rate), to be willing to invest in government debt, its expected
return should at least be equal to r. Hence, given that the government tries to borrow against the
lowest possible costs, r1t=r and r2t=r+pt
e. In other words, the interest rate on nominal debt should
compensate investors for any expected inflation during the lifetime of the debt. Hence, the
government budget constraint becomes,
g + (1+r)b+( 1 + r + p
e- p )d=t+kp + q,
where we have suppressed the time subscript and assumed that all debt is repaid and no new debt
is issued.
18 Most of the literature, including Alesina and Tabellini (1987) and Debelle (1993), implicitly use the
approximation ˜ X»X.31
Appendices B-N:
B: Welfare comparison Nash commitment versus centralized discretion [eq.(4.1)]
Assume loss functions monetary and fiscal authorities coincide with society’s. Nash commitment is
better than centralized discretion if and only if,
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Working out the products (treating (1+agS
-1) as a single term), regrouping and canceling the
common terms on the left hand side (LHS) and the right hand side (RHS) gives,
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Multiplying left and RHS by gives (4.1).
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C: Uniqueness of k
*, the value of k for which (4.1) is met with equality
Differentiate (4.1) with respect to k, to yield:
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>0 .
Combine this with the facts that for k=0 the LHS of (4.1) is less than one, that for k=(apS(1+agS
-
1))
½ the LHS of (4.1) is larger than one, and that the LHS of (4.1) is continuous, to conclude that
k
* is unique.32
D: Welfare comparison Nash commitment versus Nash discretion [eq.(4.5)]
Assume that the loss functions of the monetary and fiscal authorities coincide with society’s loss
function. Nash commitment is better than Nash discretion if and only if,
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Working out the products (treating (1+agS
-1) as single term), canceling common terms and
multiplying left and RHS by apS(1+agS
-1)
-1 gives (4.5).
E: Uniqueness of k
**, the value of k for which (4.5) is met with equality
Differentiate (4.5) with respect to k, to yield:
2 2k
apS(1 a
1
gS)
>0 .
Combine this with the facts that for k=0 the LHS of (4.5) is less than one, that for k=½ the LHS
of (4.5) is larger than one, and that the LHS of (4.5) is continuous, to conclude that k
** is unique.
F: Welfare comparison Nash discretion versus centralized discretion [eq.(4.6)]
Assume that the loss functions of the monetary and fiscal authorities coincide with society’s loss
function. Nash discretion is better than centralized discretion if and only if,
æ
ç
ç
è
ö
÷
÷
ø
1
apS
1 1
agS
æ
ç
ç
è
ö
÷
÷
ø
1 k(k d 1)
apS
1
agS
2
<
æ
ç
ç
è
ö
÷
÷
ø
1 k
apS
1
agS
2æ
ç
ç
è
ö
÷
÷
ø
(k d 1)
2
apS
1 1
agS
.
Working out products (treating (1+agS
-1) as a single term), canceling common terms and
multiplying by apS(1+agS
-1)
-2, yields,
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Bringing the third and fourth term on the RHS to the LHS and the first and second term on the
LHS to the RHS yields,33
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Working out LHS and RHS, rearranging and dividing by (k+d) yields:
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Bringing the final term on the RHS to the LHS and dividing by (k+d+2) yields (4.6).
G: Uniqueness of k
***, the value of k for which (4.6) is met with equality
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to yield,
(G.1) f(k) ºk
3 d k
2 b2(d 1) k b(d 2) 0,
which is a third order polynomial equation in k. We will show that this equation has exactly one
solution for k which is non-negative.
Note that f(0)<0, that f²(k)=6k+2d>0 if k³0 and d>0, and that f(k) and its derivatives are
continuous. Moreover, denote the solutions of f¢(k)=3k
2+2dk+(b-2(d+1))=0 by k1£k2 if such
solutions indeed exist, in which case at least one of them is non-positive. We now have the
following possibilities:
1. f¢(k)=0 has no positive solution, hence there is no extremum for k>0. Combined with the
facts that f(0)<0 and that f(k)®¥ if k®¥ (because k
3 dominates), this implies a unique
solution to equation (G.1).
2. k1£0<k2. Hence, at most one extremum exists for k>0. Combined with the facts that f(0)<0
and that f(k)®¥ if k®¥ (because k
3 dominates), this implies that there is no extremum
for k>0 (though there may a point of inflexion) and that equation (G.1) has unique
solution.34
H: Welfare comparison commitment versus discretion under fiscal leadership [eq.(4.10)]
Assume that the loss functions of the monetary and fiscal authorities coincide with society’s loss
function. Commitment under fiscal leadership is better than discretion if and only if,
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Work out products on both sides, subtract 1+g
2/agS
2 from both sides, multiply both sides by apSagS
and bring all terms on the RHS to the LHS and rearrange, to yield,
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Substitute the expression for g, multiply both sides by (1+apS+k+d)
2 and rearrange to yield,
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Working out the term in square brackets, this is equivalent to
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Rewriting the term between square brackets and dividing both sides by agS yields,
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which is (4.10).
I: Proof that (4.10) is met with equality for a unique value of k
First note that, if 2k+k
2/apS=1, the LHS of (4.10) is negative, that, if 2k+k
2/apS=1+(d+1)
2/apS, the
LHS of (4.10) is positive, and that the LHS of (4.10) is continuous. Hence there exists at least one
value for k for which (4.10) is met with equality.
Now differentiate the LHS of (4.10) with respect to k, to yield,
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which completes the proof.
J: Proof that under discretion welfare loss Nash lower than with fiscal leadership if k=0 and d>0
Assume that the loss functions of the monetary and fiscal authorities coincide with society’s loss
function. Use k=0. Nash discretion is better than fiscal discretion if and only if,
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Working out products and skipping common terms on both sides, yields,
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Multiply both sides by apSagS
2 and rearrange to yield,
2g(agSapS agS apS) g
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Note that if d=0, g=1 (because k=0, by assumption), and, hence, the LHS equals the RHS. Because
g decreases with an increase in d, the LHS is decreasing in d and, hence, LHS<RHS if d>0, which
completes the proof.
K: Proof that under discretion welfare loss lower under fiscal than
under monetary leadership if k=0 and d>0
Assume loss functions monetary and fiscal authorities coincide with society’s. Use k=0. Under
discretion, fiscal leadership is better than monetary leadership if and only if,
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Work out products, cancel common terms on both sides, multiply both sides by apSagS
2 and bring
the terms on the RHS to the LHS, to yield,
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Substitute the expression for g (using k=0) and multiply both sides by (1+apS+d)
2 to yield,
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A number of terms cancel, so that,
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If d=0, the LHS is zero. Therefore, let us evaluate the derivative of the LHS with respect to d,
which can be rewritten as:
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Hence, if k=0, then, irrespective of the value of d>0, fiscal leadership discretion is better than
monetary leadership discretion.
L: Proof that under discretion monetary leadership better than fiscal leadership if k®¥
Assume that the loss functions of the monetary and fiscal authorities coincide with society’s loss
function. Under discretion, the ratio of welfare losses under fiscal and monetary leadership can be
written as,
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If k®¥, this converges to,
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which completes the proof.
M: Proof that in general there exists a weight apM such that fiscal leadership discretion improves
upon centralized discretion, when it is not possible to distort the fiscal authority’s preferences
Assume that the preferences of the fiscal authority coincide with society’s preferences and that
agM=agS. Note that if apM=apS/(1+k+d), welfare losses under fiscal leadership discretion coincide
with welfare losses under centralized discretion (because g=1 for this value of apM). Hence, if the38
derivative of the expression for welfare losses under fiscal leadership discretion with respect to apM
is not equal to zero, when evaluated at apM=apS/(1+k+d), there exists an apM for which fiscal
leadership improves upon centralization.
First, note that, when evaluated at apM=apS/(1+k+d),
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The derivative of welfare losses under fiscal leadership discretion with respect to apM and
evaluated at apM=apS/(1+k+d) is not equal to zero if and only if,
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evaluated at apM=apS/(1+k+d).
Dividing by 2 and using that g=1 if apM=apS/(1+k+d), this is equivalent to,
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evaluated at apM=apS/(1+k+d).
Working out the products, removing terms which cancel and multiplying by agSapM
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Note that the first term on the LHS is negative, while the second term in general depends on d.
Hence, in general, fiscal leadership discretion can improve upon centralized discretion.39
N: Proofs of inequalities in Table 2
N.1: Inflation (k>0)
p
C<(=)(>)p
ND Ûk <(=)(>)1: The (in)equality p
C<(=)(>)p
ND can almost immediately be reduced to
(k-1)(1+agS
-1)<(=)(>)0, which completes the proof.
p
ND<p
FD: Comparison of both expressions shows that this is fulfilled if and only if g<1, which is
always the case if policymakers’ preferences coincide with society’s.
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which completes the proof.
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which completes the proof.40
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which is fulfilled if k£1.
N.2: Taxation (k>0)
t
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ND: This follows immediately from the fact that k(k+d+1)/apS>k/apS.
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FD: This follows immediately from the fact that g<1 if policymakers’ preferences coincide
with society’s preferences.
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which is fulfilled for k³1.41
N.3: Government spending (k>0)
Most of the rankings follow immediately from the rankings derived for tax policy. Only some of
the rankings which involve fiscal leadership with discretion have to be established.
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which completes the proof.
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which is always fulfilled if policymakers’ preferences coincide with society’s.
N.4: Welfare
Welfare rankings can be found immediately by combining equations (4.1), (4.5) and (4.6) for the
various values of k.